Roadmap to Post-Quantum Migration

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Agenda

- 1. Introduction
- 2. PQC : solutions
- 3. Migration & roadmap
- 4. Regulators and autorities



Cryptography in modern companies...





Threat scenarios





STORE-NOW & DECRYPT LATER

LONG MIGRATION PERIOD

How to deal with a threat that hasn't yet emerged



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We need preparation, awareness and planning



- Migrate in Time
- Protect what really matters
- Integrate quantum-safe solutions

Preparing for migration is an opportunity





Preparing for the quantum threat should become an important aspect of security management \bigcirc

PQC : solutions



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Solutions

• Symmetric Algorithms → Mild risk (Grover's algorithm)

We can use longer keys and longer hashes (parameters)

Asymmetric algorithms → Will be broken by Shor's algorithm

Solution: new algorithms; new mathematical problems



Hybrid solutions

Combination: **Pre-quantum** algorithm + **Post-Quantum** algorithm

Example: *a hybrid signature*

 $sign_{Hybrid}(message) = sign_{traditionnal}(message) || sign_{PQC}(message)$



Hybrid solutions

Hybrid Solution	Only Post Quantum algorithm
Proven maturity of traditional cryptography	Simpler
More complex to implement	Riskier (still maturing)
More complex to operate	

Migration : How to establish the roadmap



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Type of companies





Roadmap – Planning

- 1. Assets & cryptography inventories
- 2. Risks assessment
- 3. Plan risk-oriented migration
- 4. Migration execution
- 5. Continuous research

Inventories



Cryptographic assets inventory



Vendors dependencies inventory



Data assets inventory



Inventory of Cryptographic Assets

Goal:

- Exhaustive list of uses of cryptography
- → Track all assets to migrate (algorithms, keys, certificates)
 → Also handy outside of PQC migration

Most important part of the assessment



Inventory of Cryptographic Assets

Crypto Asset

Type



→ Standard formats allow tools to generate part of the inventory

→Some format allow dependencies reference

Inventory tools



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Inventory of dependencies on vendors

Goal:

- Exhaustive list of cryptography depending on suppliers
- Products & services (Hardware, software, CA)
- (Planned) Support for PQC
- Contracts & contacts details

Shadow IT & additional tools (messaging, documentations)



Inventory of data assets

Goal:

- List of data handled by the organisation
- Type of data: data at rest, data in transit, data in use
- Location, Usages
- Value of the data
- Classification of data
- Their protection







Cryptographic assets inventory

— ×- Vendors dependencies inventory

Data assets inventory



Risk assessment

- ➔ Prioritize assets to migrate
- ➔ Anticipate consequences

Risk

- Threat → Attacker using Quantum Computers
- Vulnerability → PQC vulnerabilities
- Impact → What if ?

<u>+ Time and effort to migrate</u>

Risk assessment: Lifetime of data assets

→ Identify **lifetime** of your information assets

- Business value
- Regulatory requirements
- Security reasons
- Confidentiality
- → Lifetime & impact

Risk assessment: Infrastructure migration time

→ Estimate the time required to migrate technical infrastructure

- Current technologies
- Current procedures
- Available quantum-safe cryptography
- Discussion with suppliers
- → Time information + migration steps information

Risk assessment: time for threat actors to access quantum technology

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→ Estimate time for threat actors to access quantum technologies

- Analyze quantum threats
 - Papers / Independant researchers
 - Industry experts
 - Guidelines

Assess the timing until current cyber defences collapse vs threat with access to quantum technology

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[2024] 32 Experts estimates of likelihood of a quantum computer able to break RSA-2048 in 24hours



Risk assessment – Quantum Risk

→ Determine quantum risk by calculating whether assets will become vulnerable before the organization can move to protect them (Mosca's inequality)





Migration planning

Goal

→ For each cryptographic asset, **decide** if, when and how to migrate

→ Decide priorities / order

• Planning of testing & implementation

Migration risks

- Forgotten assets, dependancies
- No hardware
- New crypto vulnerabilities
- Standards updates and changes
- ...

→ Mitigation plan in case of problems



Exécution

Continuous research

Relationship with suppliers

Migration execution

Regulators and autorities



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The role of the authorities







The decisions we make today will shape the security of tomorrow



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Sources

- Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2024, Mosca M & Piani M., December 2024
- A Methodology for Quantum Risk Assessment, Dr. Michele Mosca & John Mulholland, 2017
- The PQC Migration Handbook, AIVD & CWI & TNO, December 2024

What are the PQC solutions ?

Post-C	Quantum	Cryptography (PQC)	
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Why ?	Advent of Quantum Computers
What ?	Key establishment + others
How ?	Transmission of classical signals
Why it works ?	Mathematical difficulty to break the Confidientiality & integrity
When ?	Started mid 70's

Why?	Advent of Quantum Computers
What ?	Achieve key establishment
How ?	Transmission of quantum signals
Why it works ?	Physical impossibility to break the confidentiality
When ?	Started in 1984

Same **problem**, different **solutions**

PQC is an efficient and cost-effective solution while QKD is not mature yet



Discovery of Cryptographic Assets

Software development

- Cryptographic libraries
- Custom crypto components

Tool / Process in the software dev Life Cycle

	Systems and applications	Network traffic		Hardware	
•	VPN IAM Data encryption	 PKI SSH, TLS, sFTP IPSec 	• - • -	HSM Products	
	Asset Management	Network Analysis		Asset Management	



Migration plan – Info for timing

- Crypto **agility** => Prepare to Quick updates
- Maintain operations → isolate domains (PQC and preQC)
- Store now decrypt later attacks → Sensitivity + protection period
- Prioritization: business & regulation priorities,
- Planning of **testing** & implementation
- Budgeting
- => Takes a lot of time